Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice
ChristopherE. Smith

INTRODUCTION

New appointees to the United States Supreme Court often arrive
amid great expectations. Their appointing presidents hope that the appointees will support certain legal doctrines and judicial policies, and
their partisan opponents fear that they will be too effective in shaping law
and policy in undesirable directions. 1 Initially, it is difficult to assess a
new Justice's behavior and impact because it may take several years for

the newcomer to develop confidence, find his or her "voice," and become integrated into the high court's decision-making processes. 2 Justice
William Brennan argued that no experience, including service on another

appellate court, can adequately prepare someone for the responsibilities
of a Justice on the United States Supreme Court .

Thus, scholars feel

obliged to wait several terms before evaluating-with any degree of confidence-a new Justice's performance.

The summer of 1996 marked the end of Clarence Thomas's fifth
term on the United States Supreme Court-a sufficient span of time to
permit Thomas to develop and present his judicial philosophy in his voting behavior and opinions. Thomas came to the Court amid great uncer. Associate Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B.,
Harvard University, 1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (England), 1981; J.D., University
of Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988. I am indebted to my partners, Thomas Hensley of Kent State University and Joyce Baugh of Central Michigan
University, whose prior work with me writing about the United States Supreme Court
contributed to the background for this article.
1 See Christopher E. Smith & Kimberly A. Beuger, Clouds in the Crystal Ball:
PresidentialExpectations and the Unpredictable Behavior of Supreme Court Appointees,
27 AKRON L. Rnv. 115, 115-16 (1993) (some observers feared that new appointee Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's friendships with judicial conservatives would lead her to support
their views while others believed she would re-energize the Court's liberals).
2 See WILuAM 0. DouGLAs, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 45 (1980) ("It is always difficult, and especially so for a newcomer, to withdraw his agreement to one opinion at the last minute and cast his vote for the opposed view. A mature Justice may do
just that; a junior is usually too unsure to make a last-minute major shift.").
See William J. Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U.
Cm. L. REv. 473, 484 (1973).
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tainty about his potential performance as a Justice because of the tremendous controversy surrounding his confirmation hearings. 4 Thomas portrayed himself as an "openminde[d] " 5 and moderate judicial officer, although his prior record as an official in the Reagan Administration
indicated that he was likely to be very conservative. 6 Thomas "took
pains, under intense and sometimes skeptical questioning by the Senators,
to qualify or disavow views that he had forcefully and repeatedly expressed during his years on the lecture circuit as the Reagan Administration's top civil rights official. " 7 Thomas's nomination was ultimately
confirmed by the narrowest of votes in the Senate after he was accused of
sexual harassment by his former assistant, law professor Anita Hill.8 His
nomination may have been one of the most significant in recent decades,
in part because the controversy over his appointment mobilized significant political support for female electoral candidates who criticized the
Senate's handling of his confirmation. 9 Thus, Thomas's performance and
role as a member of the Rehnquist Court may be of greater public interest
and curiosity than that of other Justices who are less visible and wellknown to the public.
Unlike some Justices who, in even longer careers, fall to establish a
clear jurisprudential identity,' 0 Thomas has emerged as a distinctive
member of the high court. Thomas has not only been a consistent member of the Court's most conservative wing since his first term,' he also
4 See JANE MAYER &

JILL ABRAMSON,

STRANGE JUSTICE:

THE SELLING OF

CLARENCE THOMAS (1994); TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL
GAMES:

THE INSIDE STORY OF CLARENCE THOMAS,

ANITA HILL, AND A SUPREME

COURT NOMINATION (1993).

5 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 110 (1991) (statement of Clarence Thomas) ("If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge
that I will preserve and protect our Constitution and carry with me the values of my heritage: fairness, integrity, openmindedness, honesty, and hard work.").

6 See Neil Lewis, High Court Nominee's Testimony Continues to Frustrate Demo-

crats, N.Y. TIME, Sept. 13, 1991, at Al, A19.
Linda Greenhouse, Etching a Portrait of Judge Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15,

1991, at 28L.
See Christopher E. Smith, Politics and Plausibility: Searchingfor the Truth About
Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REv'. 697, 703 (1993).
9 See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,

CRITICAL JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS

AND

POLTICAL

CHANGE: THE IMPACT OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1993).
10 Justice Anthony Kennedy, for example, is cited as a Justice who "does not have a

consistent judicial philosophy to guide his decision making," despite serving on the Supreme Court for a decade. THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITh, & JOYCE A.
BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 75
(1997).
19,See Christopher E. Smith & Scott Patrick Johnson, The First-Term Performance of
Justice Clarence Thomas, 76 JUDICATURE 172, 174 (1993).

1997]

CLARENCE THOMAS: A DISTINCTIVE JUSTICE

3

has articulated themes that distinguish him from all of the other Justices,
including the conservative colleagues who share his preferences in determining case outcomes.

I.

OVERALL RECORD AND IMPACT

If judicial liberalism is defined in the traditional fashion as support
for individuals' rights in disputes with the government, 12 Thomas stands
out as a strong conservative in any analysis. For example, from 1991 to
1995, Thomas had the second most conservative record among Justices in
criminal procedure cases, supporting individuals in only nineteen percent
of cases, just percentage points above the most conservative Justice,
Chief Justice Rehnquist. For civil rights cases, Thomas was the second
most conservative at thirty percent-again two percentage points above
Rehnquist. 14 In the 1995 Term, Thomas joined Scalia and Rehnquist in
supporting the government in nearly ninety-one percent of nonunanimous criminal justice cases. 15 Among Justices who served on the
Rehnquist Court at any time prior to the summer of 1993, Thomas had
the most conservative voting record on cases concerning the Eighth
Amendment, capital punishment, and habeas corpus by sulorting the
Thus, as
government in more than ninety-four percent of such cases.
indicated in Table 1, Thomas casts his votes consistently with his most
conservative colleagues in civil rights and liberties cases.

12

See Jeffrey Segal & Harold Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger

Courts: Results from the Supreme Court JudicialData Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103,
103 (1989) ("Liberal decisions in the area of civil liberties are pro-person accused or
convicted of a crime, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, pro-indigent, pro-[Native
American], and anti-government in due process and privacy.").
13 See HENsL.EY, SMITH & BAUGH, supra note 10, at 89.
14 See id.

15 See Christopher E. Smith, The U.S. Supreme Court and Criminal Justice: The
1995-96 Term, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1, 7 (1996).
16 See Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The
Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 593, 597 (1995).
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Table 1-Justice Thomas's Rate of Agreement with Other Justices in
the United States Supreme17 Court's Cvil Rights and Liberties Cases, 1991
Term through 1995 Term
Justice
Scalia
Rehnquist
White
Kennedy
O'Connor
Ginsburg
Souter
Breyer
Blackmun
Stevens

Agreement %
90.1%
90.1%
76.6%
75.8%
73.5%
64.7%
62.8%
62.0%
47.4%
44.8%

Although Thomas has consistently supported conservative outcomes,
questions remain concerning whether his influence and impact on the Supreme Court extend any further than his power to cast simply one of nine
votes. Thomas has reportedly bragged that by the time "I step down
from the Court in 2034[,] [t]hey can say what they want to say, but I'm
going to [have been] making law for a long time." 18 He certainly contributes to "making law" by participating in Supreme Court decision
making, but he has failed to place his personal stamp on the law because
he is not given opportunities to write majority opinions for the Court in
important cases.
Table 2 indicates that Thomas usually writes majority
opinions only when the Justices share a strong consensus. He wrote for
the majority only five times in cases in which there were more than two
dissenters and most of his majority opinions came in unanimous cases.

17 Extrapolated from HENsLEY, SMITH & BAUGH, supra note 10, at 87-88, and
THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, & JOYcE A. BAUGH, SUPREME COURT

UPDATE: 1996 4-6 (1997). Original data was drawn from the Supreme Court Judicial
Data Base. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 12, at 103.
18 Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29-May 6, 1996, at 66, 73.
19 When the Chief Justice is in the majority, he chooses which member of the major-

ity will write the opinion on behalf of the Court. Otherwise the senior Justice in majority
makes the assignment. See LAwRENcE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 153 (3d ed. 1989).
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Table 2- The United States Supreme Court's Vote Breakdowns in
Thomas-Authored Majority Opinions, 1991 Term through 1995 Term
Vote
9-0
8-1
7-2
6-3
5-4

Number of Majority Opinions
21
4
10
4
1

Even more revealing, perhaps, are the kinds of cases in which Thomas is selected- usually by Chief Justice Rehnquist-to write on behalf
of the Court. As indicated by Table 3, Thomas receives majority assignments most frequently in cases concerning statutes, especially economic issues such as bankruptcy and taxation. He seldom receives assignments for civil rights and liberties cases, and even those that he
handled are not among the notable, important decisions of recent terms.
Thomas has had a number of majority opinions on criminal justice issues,
but only in cases with a relatively high degree of consensus. Thomas's
failure to garner choice assignments raises questions about how Chief
Justice Rehnquist (and other senior Justices) view Thomas. It may very
well be that Thomas's distinctiveness-with respect to the themes evident
in his concurring and dissenting opinions-serves to deter Rehnquist and
others from assigning important and controversial case opinions to Thomas.
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Table 3-Majority Opinions by Justice Thomas, by Subject Matter,
1991 Term through 1995 Term 2
Issue/Area

Number/Vote

Economic Issues - Statutory
(Tax, bankruptcy, ERISA, antitrust, etc.)

16

CriminalJustice
1. Melendez v. United States (1996)
[sentencing guidelines]

11
7-2

2. Wilson v. Arkansas (1995)

9-0

["knock and announce" for searches]
3. United States v. Mezzanatto (1995)

7-2

Economic Issues: United States v. IBM, 116 S.Ct. 1793 (1996); Lockheed
Corp.
v. Spink, 116 S. Ct. 1783 (1996); Peacock v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 862 (1996); Things
Remembered v. Petrarca, 116 S. Ct. 494 (1995); National Private Truck Council v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582 (1995); Nebraska Revenue Dept. v. Loewenstein,
513 U.S. 123 (1994); Associated Indus. of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994);
Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993); PREI, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49 (1993); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993); Nobelmen v. American
Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490 (1993); District
of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Holywell Corp.
v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992);
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
CriminalJustice: Melendez v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2057 (1996); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499
(1995); United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573 (1994); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); United
States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992); United
States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992).
Labor/Worker Safety Statutes: Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Hiles, 116 S. Ct. 890
(1996); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994); United States Dep't
of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487 (1994); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527
(1992).
Other Statutory: Exxon v. Sofec, 116 S. Ct. 1813 (1996); Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995); Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995); FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993);
Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
Civil Rights Related: Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656 (1993); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
Native American Treaty: South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
Full Faith and Credit: Matsushita Elec. v. Epstein, 116 S.Ct. 873 (1996).
Commerce Clause: Oregon Waste Sys. v. Environmental Quality Comm'n, 511
U.S. 93 (1994).
FirstAmendment: Rubin v. Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
20
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[admissibility of statement]
4. California Department of Corrections v.
Morales (1995)
[due process]
5. Shannon v. United States (1994)
jury instructions-insanity]
6. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez (1994)
[admissibility of confession]
7. Staples v. United States (1994)
[firearms criminal statute]
8. Godinez v. Moran (1993)
[competence to stand trial]
9. United States v. Salerno (1992)
[rules of evidence]
10. Wright v. West (1992)
[habeas corpus-plurality opinion]
11. United States v. Wilson (1992)
[calculate credit for time served]

7-2

7-2
9-0
7-2
7-2
8-1
9-0
7-2

Labor/Worker Safety Statutes
(FELA, NLRA, etc.)

4

Other Statutory

7

Civil Rights Related
1. Associated General Contractors v.
Jacksonville (1993)
[standing, affirmative action]
2. Farrarv. Hobby (1992)
[civil rights attorneys' fees]

2
7-2

5-4

Native American Treaty

1

Full Faithand Credit

1

Commerce Clause
1. Oregon Waste Systems v. Environmental
Quality Commission (1994)
[taxation of solid waste from out of state]

1
7-2
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FirstAmendment
1. Rubin v. Coors Brewing (1995)
[advertising alcohol content of beer]

1
9-0

II. THOMAS'S DISTINCTIVENESS
Over the course of his brief career on the Supreme Court, Thomas
has become increasingly assertive- relative to his colleagues-in expressing his views through concurring and dissenting opinions.2 1 In his first
three terms, Thomas ranked sixth or seventh among the Justices in taking
the initiative to present his own views outside of majority opinions.
During his most recent two terms, however, Thomas ranked fourth and
then third in writing non-majority opinions. 22 It is through these concurring and dissenting opinions that Thomas has created his own opportunities to express himself concerning the Court's most controversial issues. It is also through these opinions that Thomas has revealed to
observers the central themes of his judicial philosophy.
If one were asked to select a few words to describe Thomas based
on his judicial opinions, several specific adjectives would quickly come
to mind: originalist, formal, rigid, legalistic, and aggressive. I have argued elsewhere that Thomas, more so than other Justices, aspires to a
coherent vision of the Constitution and the role of the judiciary.23 This is
not to say, however, that Thomas's judicial philosophy lacks obvious
flaws- its questionable aspects are easy to see- or that Thomas is consistent in his reasoning and decision making. Rather, it merely recognizes
that Thomas seeks to avoid the ad hoc decision making that is characteristic of some other Justices. 2 4 He is attempting to articulate a coherent
and consistent view of constitutional law, and he seeks (not always successfully) to stick to his conception of this vision, despite its controversial implications and potential consequences. Thomas's judicial philosophy and its implications can be illuminated by examining the important
themes that he emphasizes in his opinions.
21 See David A. Kaplan, This Court's Not on TV, NEwswEEK, Oct. 9, 1995, at 64

("Thomas can lay claim to being the most aggressive conservative Justice since the
1930s.").
22 See Christopher E. Smith, Bent on Original Intent: Justice Thomas Is Asserting
a
Distinct and Cohesive Vision, 82 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (Oct. 1996).
23 See id. at 48.

24 For example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has been described as "very willing to
build consensus on opinions," thus implying an inclination to accommodate and compromise rather than consistently assert the universal correctness of a particular interpretive approach. See David J. Garrow, 7he Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1996,
(Magazine) at 65, 69.
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A. Original Intent and JudicialRestraint
Thomas seeks to base his opinions on the original intent of the
Framers of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and subsequent constitutional
amendments. His opinions are replete with references to the primacy of
the Framers' intentions. He treats these intentions as the compelling directives that dictate the outcomes and reasoning in cases. And, like other
advocates of interpretation by original intent, Thomas's stated purpose
in following the Framers is to limit the power of judges to impose their
own values and policy preferences upon the law. For example, Thomas
wrote:
It is a bedrock principle of judicial restraint that a right be lodged
firmly in the text or tradition of a specific constitutional provision before we will recognize it as fundamental. Strict adherence to this approach is essential if we are to fulfill our constitutionally assigned role
infusing
of giving full effect to the mandate of the Framers without
26
the constitutional fabric with our own political views.
Thomas has gone so far as to mischaracterize constitutional interpretation by original intent as being the standard approach in the United
States Supreme Court's decision making:
When interpreting other provisions of the Constitution, this Court has
believed itself bound by the text of the Constitution and by the intent
of those who drafted and ratified it. It should hold itself
2 7 to no less a
standard with interpreting the Speech and Press Clauses.
In fact, of course, the Supreme Court has not used original intent as
the guiding principle, 28 and this is why critics of the Court, such as Robert Bork2 9 and Edwin Meese, 30 have railed against the Court for its failure to follow the "true" approach to constitutional interpretation. This is
also why the Court's contemporary advocates of originalism, Thomas and
Antonin Scalia, write so many concurring and dissenting-as opposed to

25 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERiCA: THE POUICAL SEDUCTION OF
LAW (1990).
26 Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2188 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
27 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995) (Thomas, J.,

concurring in judgment).

28 For example, since 1958, the Supreme Court has consistently defined the Eighth

Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause according to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958), a flexible, changing standard that is the virtual antithesis of original intent.
29 See BORK, supra note 25, at 9.
30 See Edwin Meese, The Battle for the Constitution, POL. REv. 32 (1985); Debra
Cassens Moss, The Policy and Rhetoric of Ed Meese, 73 A.B.A. J. 64 (Feb. 1987).
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majority-opinions3 1 and attract keen attention from scholars for their
distinctive views. 3 2
When Thomas concedes that the Framers' original intentions are not
clear regarding a particular constitutional provision, he emphasizes Anglo-American history and long-standing principles as the source of guidance to prevent judges from imposing their own views. For example,
when Thomas concluded that "[t ]here is virtually no evidence of what the
drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean, " 3 he began his
own analysis of the issue by looking to the judicial practices in sixteenthcentury English legal proceedings. 3 4 Thomas's reliance on history demonstrates that he avoids relying-explicitly anyway-on an assessment of
a legal principle's applicability to the contexts of contemporary society.
Although Thomas may concede that original intent is not clear with
respect to certain constitutional provisions, he manifests great confidence
in his ability to "know" the Framers' intentions for most issues. He
evinces similar confidence in his ability to identify guiding historical
traditions in the absence of clear original intent. For example, Thomas
asserted himself as a kind of guardian of constitutional history when he
wrote a concurring opinion in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
simply to attack the dissent's historical analysis of the Establishment
Clause.35 While acknowledging early in the opinion that scholarly analyses disagree about the original intent of the Establishment Clause, Thomas confidently concluded his opinion by declaring that "history provides an answer for the constitutional
question posed by this case, but it
36
is not the one given by the dissent."
Thomas's confident posture belies evident "blind spots" in his understanding of constitutional history and original intent. For example,
Thomas's categorical denunciation of race-based affirmative action as
31 Thomas has become increasingly assertive relative to other Justices in asserting his

views through concurring and dissenting opinions. See Smith, Bent on OriginalIntent,
supra note 22, at 51. Scalia has consistently been one of the Court's most prolific
authors of concurring and dissenting opinions. See Christopher E. Smith et al., The FirstTerm Performanceof Justice Stephen Breyer, 79 JUDICATURE 74, 76 (1995); Christopher
E. Smith et al., The First-Term Performance of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 78 JuDICATURE 74, 78 (1994); Christopher E. Smith & Scott Patrick Johnson, The First-Term
Performance ofJustice Clarence Thomas, 76 JUDICATURE 172, 177 (1993).
2 See DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION

OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 36-37 (1996).

33 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment).

34 See id.at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
35 See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2528 (1995)
(Thomas,

J., concurring).
36 Id. at 2533 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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violating his vision of an originally-intended, color-blind Constitution
conveniently sidesteps any confrontation with the manifestly un-colorblind policies of racial segregation perpetuated by the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment3 7 and the government assistance designed for the
benefit of African Americans by those same Framers. 38 As one analyst
has observed,
[Thomas] has shown little familiarity with the most recent scholarship
about the Reconstruction Republicans and the limited scope of their
color-blind vision. This scholarship, embraced by liberal and conservative legal historians, suggests that Thomas is wrong to insist that
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was intended to forbid
racial discrimination in all circumstances .... [I]n 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, [the rights it included] were not
clearly understood to include the right to attend desegregated schools,
or the right to receive federal contracts, or the right to vote. Thomas
is trapped, in short, between his moral commitment to a color-blind
Constitution and an interpretive methodology that compels him to reject it.39
Indeed, in stretching to manufacture originalist support for his
views, Thomas has gone so far as to cite the Declaration of Independence
as the source of "the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. " 40 Reliance on such authority ought to be highly
problematic for an originalist, because the Declaration of Independence
was written by an eighteenth-century slaveowner ninety years before the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was drafted to address
the problems faced by freed slaves. Moreover, the Declaration's author,
Thomas Jefferson, was not one of the drafters of the Constitution's protections for individual rights 41 and was long dead by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was written.
37 For example, "Congress had permitted segregated schools in
the District of Co-

lumbia from 1864 onward-and... though the matter was debated thoroughly between
1871 and 1875, Congress had declined to include a prohibition against segregated schools
in the Civil Rights Act of 1875." RICHARD KLUOER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 635 (1975). In addition, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also imposed racial segregation in the
visitors' galleries at Congress. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 125 (1977).
38 See ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-

1877, at 144 (1988) ("To the extent that [the Freedman's Bureau] prohibited coercive labor discipline, took up the burden of black education, sought to protect blacks against
violence, and promoted the removal of legal barriers to blacks' advancement, the Bureau
reinforced the freedmen's aspirations.").
39 Rosen, supra note 18,
at 73.
40 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
41 Jefferson was the ambassador to France when the Constitution's original protec-
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Thomas's self-professed fealty to original intent jurisprudence makes
him the Court's strongest proponent of this controversial approach to
constitutional interpretation. His pronouncements about the primacy of
the Framers' intentions are presented with fervor and faith akin to religious proselytization. By contrast despite a reputation for self-righteous
confidence and a didactic style,

the Court's other strong advocate of

originalism, Justice Scalia, has expressed misgivings about applying the
Framers' intentions to all constitutional issues. 43 Thomas does not appear inclined to express misgivings or self-doubt, especially about originalism, and thus he positions himself to collide blindly with the many

documented impediments that make it difficult, if not impossible, to adhere actually and consistently to an originalist approach to constitutional

interpretation. "
Although Thomas espouses original intent jurisprudence as a means
to restrain judges, his behavior with respect to several issues constitutes
judicial activism of the sort that he might claim to oppose. With respect
to the issues of voting rights and affirmative action, Thomas's opinions

are unquestionably "activist" according to three of the six dimensions of
judicial activism:

1) Majoritarianism-the degree to which policies

adopted through democratic processes are judicially negated; 2) Interpretions for individuals were being drafted. See

HENsLEY, SMITH, & BAUGH, supra note 10,
at 135.
42 See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S

CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 55-75 (1993) (describing Scalia's strident language and use of
hyperbole, condemnation, and sarcasm directed at his colleagues).
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989).
What if some state should enact a new law providing public lashing, or
branding of the right hand, as punishment for certain criminal offenses?
Even if it could be demonstrated unequivocally that these were not cruel
and unusual measures in 1791, and even though no prior Supreme Court
decision has specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any federal
judge- even among the many who consider themselves originalists- would
sustain them against an eighth amendment challenge .... I am confident
that public flogging and handbranding would not be sustained by our
courts, and any espousal of originalism as a practical theory of exegesis
must somehow come to terms with that reality ....
I hasten to confess
that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine
myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.
Id. at 861, 864.
44 See STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1987); Judith
A.
Baer, The Fruitless Searchfor OriginalIntent, in JUDGING THE CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 49-71 (M. McCann & G. Houseman eds. 1989);
Christopher E. Smith, JurisprudentialPolitics and the Manipulation of History, 13 W. J.
BLACK STUD. 156 (1989).
45 See Bradley Canon, Defining the Dimensions of JudicialActivism, 66 JUDICATURE
236, 239 (1983).
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tive Stability-the degree to which earlier court decisions, doctrines, or
interpretations are altered; 3) Availability of an Alternate Policymakerthe degree to which a judicial decision supersedes serious consideration
of the same problem by other governmental institutions." Thomas has
written opinions concerning voting rights 47 and affirmative action" that
have sought to narrow or invalidate actions by elected branches of government (Majoritarianism dimension), alter established precedents
(Interpretive Stability dimension), and use judicial power to decide issues
that could be left to other branches of government (Availability of Alternative dimension).49 Thus, according to one observer, " [Justice Thomas]
wants to use his unelected office to short-circuit the political debate about
whether to end affirmative action or to50 abolish voting districts that have
been constructed on the basis of race."
B. Federalism
Thomas employs originalism not only to restrain judges, but also to
restrain the federal government from interfering with his vision of the
states' substantial autonomy to handle their own affairs. 5 1 For example,
in his critique of judicially-ordered school desegregation remedies, Thomas declared, "Usurpation of the traditionally local control over education not only takes the judiciary beyond its proper sphere, it also deprives
52
the States and their elected officials of their constitutional powers."
Thomas provided a detailed explanation of his belief in the primacy of
the states within the constitutional governing system in an opinion supportinf the states' authority to impose term limits on members of Congress.
With respect to judicial federalism, Thomas also would allow state
courts to have significant autonomy, even if it means clashing with a federal court's interpretation of federal law. According to Thomas,

46 See Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Emerging Majority: Restraining
the High Court or Transforming Its Role, 24 AKRON L. REv. 393, 397 (1990).
47 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
48 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995)
(Thomas, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

49 See Joyce A. Baugh & Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas: Confirmation
Ve-

raci Meets PerformanceReality, 19 SEArrLE U. L. REv. 455, 480-90 (1996).
Rosen, supra note 18, at 67.
Si See Kaplan, supra note 21, at 64 ("[Thomas's] dissenting opinion in the term-limits
case ... would have turned the federal system on its head. States would have become
the real sovereigns in the constitutional framework.").
52 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 138 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
53 See United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995)
(Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law,
but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law
requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a
(lower) federal court's interpretation. In our federal system, a state
trial court's interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than
that of the federal
54 circuit court of appeals in whose circuit the trial
court is located.

Thomas has sought to advance judicial federalism in the area of habeas corpus through his effort to require federal court deference to state
court decisions. 55 By supporting the Rehnquist Court's efforts to limit
convicted offenders' access to habeas corpus review in the federal
courts, 5 6 Thomas appears to contradict his confirmation testimony in
which he said that "we should be most concerned about providing all the
rights and all the due process that can be provided and
57 should be provided to individuals who may face [the death penalty]."
In United States v. Lopez, 58 the blockbuster Commerce Clause case
in which "for the first time in 58 years a court majority restricted Congress's ability to expand Federal [commerce-power] authority after
[Congress] enacted an anti-gun possession law," Thomas articulated his
originalist views in a concurring opinion. As in the Rosenberger case, 60
Thomas's preferred outcome prevailed and he agreed with the majority
opinion. Thus, his opinion seemed motivated by his self-appointed role
as guardian of constitutional history because its sole purpose was to educate the dissenters about the Constitution's original intent on the issue.
Thomas's opinion argued that the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause doctrines had deviated from the Framers' intentions ever since the
New Deal. He quoted approvingly from long-rejected precedents such as
United States v. E.C. Knight6 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.62 that disLockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
55 See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992); see also Larry Yackle, The Habeas
Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331, 2394 (1993) ("Parsing the opinions in West, one
concludes that the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Scalia would now adopt a deference rule for all the issues in habeas corpus cases .. ").
56 See J. Thomas Sullivan, A PracticalGuide to Recent Developments in Federal
Habeas Corpus for Practicing Attorneys, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317 (1993) (describing judicia5 -created procedural barriers to federal habeas corpus review).
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Con. 133 (1991) (statement of Clarence Thomas).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
60 Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, supra note 24, at 65.

61 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
62 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
62 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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tinguished "commerce"- which was subject to regulation by Congressfrom manufacturing and mining that, according to these opinions, were
not. Thomas opposed the Supreme Court's emphasis during the past
sixty years on the "substantial effects" of activities on commerce in favor
of a very narrow view of interstate commerce. According to Thomas,
"despite being well aware that agriculture, manufacturing, and other
matters substantially affected commerce, the founding Aeneration did not
cede authority over all these activities to Congress."
Thus, Thomas
]
concluded that "[t he Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life
(even many matters that would have substantial effects on commerce)
would remain outside the reach of the Federal Government. Such affairs
would continue to be under the exclusive control of the states." 64
Thomas may be perfectly correct in his reading of history for original intent purposes on this issue, but the implications of his desire to return to the distribution of governmental powers during the nineteenth
century (and earlier) is staggering. American history would be completely different if Thomas's views had been dominant throughout the
twentieth century. Thomas's views, for example, would seem to preclude federal child labor laws and other laws protecting workers' health
and safety, thus returning constitutional law to the doctrines of Hammer
v. Dagenhart.65 Thomas could respond that the people of a state could
pressure their own legislatures to regulate child labor and other matters,
but without national legislation, there would be significant countervailing
economic pressures. The questions posed by constitutional scholars concerning the aftermath of Hammer v. Dagenhart raise significant questions
about the implications of Thomas's position: "Without the support of
federal [child labor laws] could New York or Massachusetts protect their
textile industries from the competition of child labor mills in North
Carolina? Could New York protect its home market by forbidding the
sale in New York of the products of child labor?" 66 Moreover, if Thomas's approach would invalidate NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.67
and thereby diminish the ability of workers to form unions and engage in
collective bargaining, corporations might have unchallenged dominance
over policy making at the state level.
If employed in the 1960s, Thomas's approach would also have
blocked the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
63 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 591 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Id.
65 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
64

66 WILLIAM B.

LOCKHART ET AL.,

MENTs, QUESTIONS 80 (6th ed. 1986).
67 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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barred racial discrimination in public accommodations.
The Supreme
Court stretched congressional commerce power authority in a manner
clearly impermissible to Thomas when it approved Title II in Katzenbach
69
v. McClung.
What path would racial segregation and discrimination
have taken if the federal government had been barred from attacking it in
the private sector? What impact would there be on other aspects of civil
rights law, such as Title V11 70 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act71 barring various categories of employment discrimination, if
the country followed Thomas's view that the nation must recognize that
"[a]t the time the original Constitution was ratified, 'commerce' consisted of selling,
buying, and bartering as well as transporting for these
72
purposes?"
In deciding Commerce Clause issues since the 1930s, the Supreme
Court has generally taken into account social developments within society
and developed constitutional doctrine in response to the recognition of
social problems. The Court's expansion of congressional regulatory
power to cover manufacturing and mining, for example, reflected a recognition that these activities were inseparable from, and had a substantial
impact on, a national economy that, in the 1930s, was beset by monumental difficulties. 73 In the 1960s, as the national governing institution
that had taken the lead in combating discrimination, the Supreme Court
finally saw other government institutions joining its effort through the
Civil Rights Act:
The Supreme Court's symbolic statement in Brown [v. Board of Education] in 1954 helped to mobilize and encourage various actors in the

political system to push for racial equality. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 represented the moment when the other branches of government
finally acted to endorse unambiguously the racial equality goals espoused by the Supreme Court one decade earlier. At that historical
moment, could the Supreme
Court have decided [Katzenbach v.
74
McClung] any other way?
Thomas does not necessarily look to the United States Constitution
to protect citizens from improper government action. When Thomas
joined the Court's decision in Bennis v. Michigan, approving forfeiture
of property by an innocent co-owner in conjunction with a criminal case,
68 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.
(1981).
69 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

(1981).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1982).
72 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
71

73 See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES
FOR THE CONSTTUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 811 (1993).
74 CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
78 (1992).
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Thomas noted that "[t]his case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable. 75
According to Thomas, despite the serious potential risks posed to the
public by a misuse of forfeiture, the courts and the Constitution have no
role in providing protection. In Thomas's words,
Improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel
employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose
property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those
who associate with criminals, than a component of a system of justice.
When the property sought to be forfeited has been entrusted by its
owner to one who uses it for crime, however, the Constitution apparently assigns to the States and to the political branches of the Federal
76
Government the primary responsibility for avoiding that result.
C. Rejection of EmpiricalEvidence and Social Context
Unlike the mid-twentieth-century Justices who responded to social
developments in their Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Thomas believes
that he should follow his perceptions of the Framers' intentions without
regard for the social problems of American society. Thomas has been
described as "a voice for a formal, even rigid approach to constitutional
interpretation, a rejection of the idea that modern influences might cast a
new light on the intentions of the Framers." 7 7 Thomas's rigid adherence
to his legal theory, without regard to the social context in which law will
impact people's lives, extends beyond Commerce Clause cases to other
issues as well. This rejection of social knowledge as an influence on legal decision making is evident in several circumstances.
Thomas opposes the use of social science evidence as a basis for
constitutional decision making. In criticizing judicial decisions ordering
school desegregation, Thomas asserted that "[t]he lower courts should
not be swayed by the easy answers of social science, nor should they accept the findings, and the assumptions, of sociology and psychology at
the price of constitutional principle." 7 8 Thomas further announced that
"[t]he judiciary is fully competent to make independent determinations
concerning the existence of state action without
the unnecessary and mis79
leading assistance of the social sciences."

75 Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1001-02 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
77 David J. Garrow, On Race, It's Thomas v. an Old Ideal, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2,
1995, at El.
78 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122-23 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 121 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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One source of his hostility to social science apparently stems from
his vehement opposition to studies of psychological harms experienced by
African American students who are victims of racial segregation, such as
Kenneth Clarke's famous "dolls" study that was cited in Brown v. Board
of Education." Thomas defensively regards such research findings as
resting on an assumption that African Americans are inferior to whites.
In Thomas's words,
[The [lower] court has read our cases to support the theory that black
students suffer an unspecified psychological harm from segregation
that retards their mental and educational development.

This approach

not only relies upon questionable social science research rather than
constitutional principle, but it also rests on an assumption of black inferiority.81

Ironically, Thomas's rejection of social science in favor of claimed
adherence to the constitutional principles of originalism appears to rest on
his own assumptions about social reality. Thomas's defensive rejection
of empirical research underlying reasoning in school desegregation cases
seems based on his own observations and conclusions that racial segregation per se does not have a harmful impact on African American students.
This is not Thomas's only visible instance of relying on his own perceptions of social reality. For example, in discussing racial discrimination
in peremptory challenges applied to potential jurors, Thomas remarked
that it can be "reasonably surmised, without direct evidence in any particular case, that all-white juries might judge black defendants unfairly. " 82 Thomas's vehement rejection of empirical research while incorporating his own views of social reality clashes with his espoused
reliance on original intent, legal history, and judicial traditions as the
sole determinants of judicial outcomes and reasoning.
In light of Thomas's denunciations of social science, one can wonder what he would have done if presented with statistical evidence on racial discrimination in the death penalty, such as the pre-Thomas Supreme
Court considered in McCleskey v. Kemp. 3 The majority opinion in
McCleskey did not reject the use of social science evidence. Indeed, Justice Powell defended the use of statistical proof in employment discrimination and jury selection cases 8 4 The majority did, however, reject the
use of statistics to prove systemic discrimination in capital sentencing,
and apparently Thomas would likely agree with that conclusion in light of
80 See KLUGER, supra note 37, at 315-20, 706 (1975).
81

Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114.

Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
83 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
84 See id. at 294-96.
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his view that courts can do without "the unnecessary and misleading assistance of the social sciences. " 85 By contrast, a memorandum in the
Thurgood Marshall Papers at the Library of Congress revealed that
Thomas's closest ideological cousin, Justice Scalia, accepted the statistics
in McCleskey but rejected the notion that the Court should act against racial biases in the criminal
6 justice process because he regarded those bi"ineradicable."
as
ases
By formally rejecting the value and utility of social knowledge and
asserting that rigid legal principles can solve all issues, Thomas is not
merely blinding himself to the relationship between law and society, he is
also revealing his ignorance of society. Perhaps this is not entirely surprising for a man who reportedly stopped reading newspapers or watching television news after his controversial confirmation hearings in
1991. 7 For example, in questioning the continuing need for judicial
remedies for school segregation, Thomas observed that contemporary racial separation in housing and schools stems from people's voluntary
choices that create de facto segregation that is beyond the reach of judicial remedies: "The continuing 'racial isolation' of schools after de jure
segregation has ended may well reflect voluntary housing choices or
other private decisions. " 88 Such a statement ignores the history of government-sponsored, discriminatory real estate practices that helped to establish race-based housing patterns.8 9
In another example, Thomas naively asserted that mandatory death
sentences would eliminate racial discrimination and capriciousness in
capital sentencing. 90 According to Thomas, "One would think, however,
that by eliminating explicit jury discretion and treating all defendants
equally, a mandatory death penalty scheme was a perfectly reasonable
legislative response to the concerns expressed in Furman [v. Georgia]." 9 1
Thomas's statement, however, shows a complete lack of understanding
about how the criminal justice system really works. Thomas's formal fo8 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121.

Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies
From the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER
L. REv. 1035, 1038 (1994).
87 See James Vicini, Thomas' Conservative Bent Still Angers Many, DET.
NEws, Oct.
17, 1996, at 6A; Rosen, supra note 18, at 69.
88 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 116 (Thomas, J., concurring).
86

89 See OuvER C. Cox, RACE RELATIoNS:

ELEMENTS AND SoCIAL DYNAMIcs 132-37

(1976); THOMAS F. PLrIGREW, RACIAL DISCRmNATION IN THE UNrrED STATES 38
(1975).

See Paul M. Barrett, On the Right: Thomas Is Emerging as Strong Conservative
Out to Prove Himself, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 26, 1993, at Al.
91 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 487 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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cus on a single decision point-the sentencing decision- ignores how
cumulative discretionary decisions actually determine death sentences,
decisions that could still operate on a discriminatory basis even in a mandatory death penalty scheme. In the social reality that Thomas does not
recognize and understand,
Prosecutors make subjective decisions, based on a complex variety of
factors, about whether to seek the death penalty. Likewise, jurors
make comparable subjective decisions [about whether to convict and
which charge to convict on].... If they deliberately apply discriminatory criteria, the defendant cannot challenge their decision unless
the decision makers openly express their biases. Moreover, in this
complex, multi-step decisional process, decision makers may unconsciously apply their prejudices, thus precluding any possibility of
proving the existence of discrimination.

D.

The Color-Blind Constitution

As indicated by the discussions of the foregoing themes, Thomas
argues strongly for his conception of a color-blind Constitution. This
93
vision is not necessarily supported by his original intent jurisprudence.
In addition, Thomas does not accurately examine the intentions of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers.
With respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment, Thomas observes the "fundamental truth that the Government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race," 94 and
"[a]t the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies
the principle that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, and
not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups." 95 Unlike his decisions concerning other issues, Thomas does not devote himself to a discussion of original intent but instead assumes that the Fourteenth
Amendment's principles create a color-blind Constitution.
Thomas appears insulted by school desegregation decisions. Although he reportedly recognizes that racial segregation in schools perpetuates inequality by providing unequal resources for students,
the
language of his opinions makes it appear that he believes that judges are
misguided when they seek to remedy segregation. For example, Thomas
stated that " [i]t never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to

92 Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REv. 797, 830
(1990).
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
94 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
95 Id.

96 See Rosen, supra note 18, at 66.
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97
assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior."
Such a statement implies no understanding of the historical reality that
all-black schools have consistently been short-changed in the allocation of
resources and that those resource disparities were the source of inferior
opportunities and services for African American students. By contrast,
Thomas's opinions emphasize his defensive viewpoint that:
if integration therefore is the only way that blacks can receive a
proper education, then there must be something inferior about blacks.
Under this theory, segregation injures blacks because blacks, when
left on their own, cannot achieve. To my way of thinking, that conclusion is the
result of a jurisprudence based upon a theory of black
9
inferiority. 8
Do such racist notions underlie the well-intentioned efforts of judges
who ordered school desegregation remedies or has Thomas distorted the
basis for such opinions? Clearly, Thomas is inferring this conclusion
from his own reaction to such cases because it would be difficult to find

evidence that any cases rely on such a theory rather than on a concern
about unequal resources and concomitant negative impacts on opportunities for African American students.
Moreover, Thomas appears to be the first Justice to criticize implicitly the premise of Brown v. Board of Education, both for its reliance
on social science and for its condemnation of racial segregation. A
commentator once observed that "[a]nybody who opposed [Brown] today
would be assailed as a segregationist crank. ,99 It seems ironic that the
successor to Thurgood Marshall's seat on the Supreme Court should become the first potential "crank" by criticizing Brown.
Thomas is also vehement in his opposition to race-based affirmative
action, in part, because he is offended by what he regards as the stigmatizing effects of such policies upon minority group members. According
to Thomas,
Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively provoke resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government's use of race. These programs
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to

develop dependencies
or to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled"
100
to preferences.

97 Jenkins, 515

U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring).

98 Id. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99 Stuart Taylor, Meese v. Brennan:

Who's Right About the Constitution?, NEW
REPuBuIc, Jan. 6 & 13, 1986, at 21.
100 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995).
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Thomas's views are consistent with his admiration for the self-help
philosophy of Booker T. Washington.10 1 However, in light of his faith
in formal legal doctrine and his ignorance about the social reality underlying the intersection of law and society, Thomas is open to criticism on
two counts. First, he can be criticized about the clash between originalism and his vision of a color-blind Constitution as well as his lack of recognition of that clash.1°2 Second, he might be criticized for an implicit
underestimation of the pervasiveness of racial discrimination and his arguably too-optimistic view of minority group members' opportunities 10to3
shape their own destinies in light of continuing racial barriers.
Moreover, Thomas's position seems to presume that the agencies responsible for enforcing anti-discrimination laws can effectively handle the
task of 04
combating discrimination. This presumption is probably not accurate. 1
E. Diminution of ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Prisoners
In applying his vision of originalism, Thomas has been especially
outspoken in arguing that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments does not apply to protect prisoners inside correctional institutions. In a dissenting opinion in a case concerning a
shackled prisoner who was beaten by two corrections officers, Thomas
argued that "for generations, judges and commentators regarded the
Eighth Amendment as applying only to tortuous punishments meted out
by statutes or sentencing judges, and not generally to any hardship that
might befall a prisoner during incarceration. " 105 He noted that the
United States Supreme Court did not apply the Eighth Amendment to
prison conditions and practices "until 1976-185 years after the Eighth

See Rosen, supra note 18, at 69.
102 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
103 See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HosTILE,
101

UNEQUAL (1992) (examining continuing problems of racial inequality in the United
States).
104 See TOM WICKER, TRAGIC FAILURE: RACIAL INTEGRATION IN AMERICA 105 (1996).
[Shelby] Steele was eloquent on his view of affirmative action as an indignity to blacks and a cause of hypocrisy in whites. But neither he nor
Bob Dole, who also demanded tough enforcement of antidiscrimination
laws, noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission, which
is charged with that duty, has an overwhelming backlog of cases, so many
that it may never be able to decide them all. If enforcement of antidiscrimination laws is the alternative to affirmative action, race, sex, and ethnic discrimination will be with us for a long time.
Id.
105 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Amendment was adopted. " 106
Thomas asserted that

23

Turning to the intent of the Framers,

[s]urely prison was not a more congenial place in the early years of
the Republic than it is today; nor were judges and commentators so
naive as to be unaware of the often harsh conditions of prison life.
Rather, they simply did not conceive of
10 7the Eighth Amendment as
protecting inmates from harsh treatment.

He reiterated his view in a108
later case by relying, again, on his interpretation of the Framers' intent.
Thomas's assessment of history is probably accurate, but also incomplete with respect to the Framers' views of prisons. The concept of
the prison as an institution for serving significant criminal sentences was
essentially born in the nineteenth century-after the Eighth Amendment
had been drafted and ratified. The Eighth Amendment was written in
1789. Walnut Street Jail, the country's initial experiment with incarceration as punishment, was established in 1790, the same year the State
of Connecticut turned "Newgate," a series of copper mines, into a state
prison. 109 Most states did not establish prisons as a mode of punishment
until the nineteenth century.110 Prior to that time-up to and including
the drafting of the Eighth Amendment-criminal punishment emphasized
whipping, branding, stocks, execution, and other forms of nonincarcerative physical punishments. 11 In fact, one study found that only
nineteen criminal offenders were sentenced to jail as a form of punishment in New York during the entire period from 1691 to 1776.112
During the Framers' era, jails were used to house prisoners waiting
for trial. They also housed debtors, who were often allowed to come and
go as they pleased, as long as they returned to sleep in the jail at night. 1 3
Vagrants, paupers, and others were sent to workhouse jails where they
could be supplied
with food and clothes by friends and relatives, if they
14
had any.1

at 20 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
108 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
text and history of the Eighth Amendment, together with pre- Estelle [v. Gamble (1976)1
precedent, raise substantial doubt in my mind that the Eighth Amendment proscribes a
prison deprivation that is not inflicted as part of the sentence.").
106 Id.
107

109 See LAwRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNisHmENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
78

(1993).
110 See id. at 79-82.

III See a. at 48.
112 See id.
113

See id. at 49.

114 See id. at 50.
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In light of this history of punishment in early America, Thomas
misstates the Framers' views on prison conditions in the sense that the
Framers could not have had opinions concerning prisons, as such institutions were yet to develop. Although Thomas can claim accurately that
the Framers did not intend for the Eighth Amendment to apply to conditions in detention facilities, his argument is more correctly understood as
pointing to the problem of using originalism with respect to issues about
which the Framers had no knowledge. Certainly, the authors of the
Eighth Amendment could never have imagined the contemporary situation in which more than one million Americans are serving prison terms
for various offenses. 115 However, Thomas's rigid and formal approach
to constitutional interpretation precludes him from taking account of
changing social developments since the eighteenth century.
Thomas has carried his rejection of prisoners' rights beyond the
Eighth Amendment and into other areas. For example, the United States
Supreme Court developed a "right of access to the courts" for prisoners
in a series of cases in the 1960s and 1970s.1 6 The right of access is regarded as "perhaps the most basic of rights possessed by inmates; certainly it is the foundation for every other right an inmate has.... Without access [to the courts], inmates have no way of vindicating their rights
through judicial action. " H7 If abusive practices occur behind prison
walls, there might be no way for prisoners to gain protection if they cannot raise legal claims in court. Thomas, however, has advocated the narrowest possible interpretation of the right of access. According to Thomas, "That right ...

is a right not to be arbitrarily prevented from

lodging

violation of a federal

court ....

a claimed

right

in a

federal

There is no basis in history or tradition for the proposition

that the State's constitutional obligation is any broader. " "
In other
words, Thomas believes that prison officials cannot prevent prisoners
from mailing legal papers to the courthouse, but, he argues, there is no
obligation to provide legal materials or even the envelopes and stamps
that would enable prisoners to file legal claims.
Because prisoners have no right to counsel for habeas corpus actions
and civil rights lawsuits, H9 they must prepare their own cases as pro se
115

See Darrell K. Gilliard & Allen J. Beck, Prison and Jail Inmates, 1995 in BuREAu

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 2 (Aug. 1996).
116 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 817 (1977) (right to use prison law libraries if
other forms of legal assistance are not provided); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487,
490 (1969) (right to assistance from jailhouse lawyers if prisons do not provide other
forms of legal assistance).
117 MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 3-4 (2d ed. 1993).
118 Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2195 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
119 See MUSHLIN, supra note 117, at 41-42.
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actions. Under current doctrine, even access to a prison law library does
not assure access to the courts because so many prisoners are illiterate,
mentally ill, not fluent in English, and otherwise unable to make use of
legal research materials. 1 20 Even prisoners who are not handicapped in
some way usually cannot prepare legal actions effectively because they
have no training in the law.' 1 Thomas's interpretation of the right of
access would significantly weaken an already unreliable right and, in
addition, diminish all other rights possessed by prisoners that depend on
judicial supervision and vindication. Of course, since Thomas does not
believe originalism provides a basis for recognizing rights for prisoners,
this result would advance his preference for a near absence of prisoners'
rights.
With the issue of prisoners' rights, Thomas's reliance on his interpretation of originalism helps to support his other predominant themes of
federalism and judicial restraint. As Thomas argued in his dissent in
Hudson v. McMillian,
Today's expansion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause beyond all bounds of history and precedent is, I suspect, yet another
manifestation of the pervasive view that the Federal Constitution must
address all ills in our society. Abusive behavior by prison guards is
deplorable conduct that properly evokes outrage and contempt. But
that does not mean that it is invariably unconstitutional. The Eighth
Amendment is not, and should not be turned into, a National Code of

Prison Regulation. 122
When Thomas concludes that "primary responsibility for preventing
and punishing [abusive practices and misconduct by prison officials] rests
not with the Federal Constitution but with the laws and regulations of the
various States," 12 he highlights the myopic vision and use of history attendant to his fealty to originalism. Although Thomas accurately surmises that the Framers of the Constitution did not anticipate heavy reliance on incarceration as the means for criminal punishment, he
effectively ignores the actual history of corrections in seeking to withdraw the judiciary from involvement in such issues. 12 4 Thomas's ap12D See Christopher E. Smith, Examining the Boundaries of Bounds:
Prison Law Libraries and Access to the Courts, 30 How. L.J. 27, 34-35 (1987).
121 See Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.N.J. 1982) ("Access to full

law libraries [to provide access to the courts for prisoners] makes about as much sense as
furnishing medical services through books like: 'Brain Surgery Self-Taught,' or 'How to

Remove Your Own Appendix,' along with scalpels, drills, hemostats, sponges, and sutures.").
122 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12 Id.
124 There are many examples of prisons in which inmates were starved, beaten,
exposed to infectious diseases, and denied facilities for personal hygiene.

See LYNN S.
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proach would place the prevention of abusive practices directly into the
hands of the state legislatures and executive branch officials who fostered
and tolerated such practices throughout most of American history. 12
Again, Thomas's unwillingness to recognize the social history and contexts of problems posed in the law leads him to produce formalistic
"answers" that disconnect constitutional law from the human beings
within American society.
CONCLUSION

When Thomas testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee at his
confirmation hearings, he asserted that one of his desirable attributes and
qualifications for the position of Supreme Court Justice was his empathic
understanding of the burdens faced by the people at the bottom of American society. For example, Thomas claimed that he felt a connection to
people drawn into the criminal justice system:
You know, on my current court [the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit] I have occasion to look out
the window that faces C Street, and there are converted buses that
bring in the criminal defendants to our criminal justice system,
busload after busload. And you look out, and you say to yourself,
and I say to myself almost every day, But for the grace of God there

goI.
So you feel that you have the same fate, or could have, as those

individuals. So I can walk in their shoes, and I can bring something
different to the Court. And I think it is a tremendous responsibility,
and it is a humbling responsibility; and12 6it is one that, if confirmed, I
will carry out to the best of my ability.
One searches in vain, however, for clear evidence in Thomas's
opinions that he has brought his empathic understanding of social reality
to the Supreme Court (with the exception of his defensiveness about desegregation and affirmative action). Instead, Thomas has explicitly rejected and denigrated considerations of social reality in judicial decision
making, and he has repeatedly asserted that formal adherence to the
original intentions of the Constitution's Framers is the only legitimate
approach to constitutional interpretation. Thomas supposedly felt a connection to the people drawn into the criminal justice system, yet he is the
BRAHAM & SHELDON KRANTz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SENTENCING,
CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTs 514-16 (6th ed. 1997).
125 See Christopher E. Smith, FederalJudges' Role in Prisoner Litigation: What's
Necessary? What's Proper?,70 JUDICATURE 144, 149 (1986).
126 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 260 (1991) (statement of Clarence Thomas).
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Court's foremost advocate of virtually eliminating constitutional protec-

tions for incarcerated people. His themes of originalism, federalism, judicial restraint, and rejection of social context considerations seem to negate directly his confirmation testimony regarding his approach to
judicial decision making. The jarring contrast between his testimony and
his performance raises disturbing questions about his veracity at the time
of his nomination.127
The one situation in which Thomas's empathic understanding seems
to surface is with respect to school desegregation and affirmative action.
Thomas appears to project his feelings and perceptions onto all African

Americans by defensively viewing many judges' concerns about racial
separation in schools as based on a theory of black inferiority'2s and by
characterizing the consequences of affirmative action as harmful.12
However, Thomas's experiences as a highly motivated student taught by
devoted nuns in segregated Catholic schools and guided by a strong pa-

rental figure (his grandfather) may not be representative of the experiences of less strongly supported students in resource-starved, conflictladen public schools. 0 Similarly, the sting of the stigmatizing effects of
may not
affirmative action that he felt as a student at Yale Law School

127
128
129
130

See Baugh & Smith, supra note 49, at 495-96.
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
In Thomas's parochial school, "the sisters devoted themselves to their pupils,

drilling into them a sense of purpose and academic rigor rarely found in the segregated
black public schools .... [A] schoolmate of Thomas's, Lester Johnson... noted that
'we were taught that we were smarter than the other blacks.'" MAYER & ABRAMsoN,
supra note 4, at 42. This supportive environment that encouraged self-esteem may differ
greatly from the environments affecting other African American students. See WICKER,
supra note 104, at 160-61.
Surveying some Texas school districts, Ferguson found repeated patterns
of black student behavior: boys' academic performance falling off by the
seventh grade and falling farther by ninth; girls' performance slipping to
the level of the boys' in ninth grade; after that, the girls "leveling off" and
the boys falling farther behind. Teachers tended to see these black learning patterns as fitting their stereotypes of less capable black pupils .... An "antiachievement" pressure is thus at work, and even gifted
black pupils, as responsive to peer pressures as any other young people,
sometimes succumb rather than be accused of acting white .... But black
youths, like most adolescents, often prefer the approval of street-talking
peers to that of their parents or teachers or some vague idea of a future
employer.
Id.
131 See Rosen, supra note 18, at 69 ("Thomas told the Washington Post that he opposed affirmative action in law school because it was inherently stigmatizing: 'Every
time you walked into a law class at Yale it was like having a monkey jump down on your
back from the Gothic arches.'").
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be applicable to the experiences of other African Americans who see and
experience the effects of affirmative action in other contexts. 3 2
After completing five terms on the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas
has established a consistent and predictable voting record as a dependable
member of the Court's most conservative wing. In addition, he articulates and aspires to follow a vision of constitutional interpretation by
original intent that simultaneously advances his preferences for federalism, judicial restraint, and the diminution of constitutional protections for
individuals. Relative to other Justices, Thomas has achieved a degree of
coherence and consistency in his opinions. The missing element for
Thomas, however, is influence. He is not given opportunities to write
majority opinions on important issues and except for Scalia and
Rehnquist, Thomas seldom persuades other Justices to endorse his increasingly assertive articulation of originalism or other themes. Thomas's ultimate influence as a Justice is likely to depend on future changes
in the Court's composition. Unless like-minded appointees support or
adopt Thomas's approach in the future, Thomas's ultimate legacy on the
Court is likely to be one of a notable voice that attracted attention but
never succeeded in determining the direction of the law.
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For example, an alternative viewpoint- from an African American's perspective-

is presented by Professor Cornel West:
Given the history of this country, it is a virtual certainty that without affirmative action racial and sexual discrimination would return with a
vengeance. Even if affirmative action fails significantly to reduce black
poverty or contributes to the persistence of racist perceptions in the workplace, without affirmative action black access to America's prosperity
would be even more difficult to obtain and racism in the workplace would
persist anyway.
CORNEL WEST, RACE MATIERS 64 (1993).

